The theory of collusion and competition policy. The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy 2019-02-05

The theory of collusion and competition policy Rating: 7,1/10 243 reviews

Reading : The Theory Of Collusion And Competition Policy

the theory of collusion and competition policy

The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Product Description A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. Skillfully edited by two outstanding leaders in the field, the volume will be a precious source for students, researchers and practitioners that need to figure out what research has achieved in recent years on these important policy issues. These empirical findings, from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing industries.

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The theory of collusion and competition policy (eBook, 2017) [blueshirtsunited.com]

the theory of collusion and competition policy

Competition policy in small economies is becoming increasingly important, since the number of small jurisdictions adopting such policy is rapidly growing. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. General contact details of provider:. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome.

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The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy (MIT Press)

the theory of collusion and competition policy

The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains extensive empirical research in private industry. This particular edition is in a Hardcover format. If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. You can help adding them by using. His unique and novel approach to understanding and analyzing competition policy will make this required reading to all scholars, policymakers and students concerned with the subject.

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Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory

the theory of collusion and competition policy

Check on the provider's whether it is in fact available. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. This book is a valuable contribution to the literature.

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The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy

the theory of collusion and competition policy

A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kristin Waites. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties.

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Competition policy, collusion, and tacit collusion

the theory of collusion and competition policy

The second and third are to develop a particular specification of a standard model of noncooperative collusion that permits explicit solution for equilibrium outputs and reversion thresholds and to extend this analysis to allow for a deterrence-based competition policy that investigates conduct based on observed high prices investigation thresholds. Gal's focus extends beyond domestic competition policy to the evaluation of the current trend toward the worldwide harmonization of policies. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. This volume outlines the impact of the Ministry of Economic Development on the effectiveness of the Commerce Act, international perspectives on competition law and methods for administering penalties in competition law cases. This book seeks to place in perspective the growing use of economics in European competition law enforcement by examining precisely how economics contributes to the enforcement activity of the European Commission and Courts. He synthesizes a mixture of historical, theoretical and policy perspectives that only an experienced and accomplished scholar can provide.

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The theory of collusion and competition policy (eBook, 2017) [blueshirtsunited.com]

the theory of collusion and competition policy

This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. To find whether it is available, there are three options: 1. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. Christopher Decker provides unique empirical insights as to how economic theory, thinking, techniques and data have featured in decision-making in the area of co-ordinated effects. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and monopolistic markets.

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The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy

the theory of collusion and competition policy

This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Providing concise analysis of those amendments, and of topics relating to the original Commerce Act, it pays particular attention to the introduction of economic regulation into the electricity and telecommunication markets. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.

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Download [PDF] The Theory Of Collusion And Competition Policy Free Online

the theory of collusion and competition policy

It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. Bringing scholars and policymakers to the frontiers of research and addressing the critical issues of the day, the book presents original important new theoretical and empirical results. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. The problem is that once you have gotten your nifty new product, the the theory of collusion and competition policy gets a brief glance, maybe a once over, but it often tends to get discarded or lost with the original packaging.

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The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy

the theory of collusion and competition policy

This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion. We have no references for this item. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. The first is to model collusion in a way that is distinct from noncooperative collusion.

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