In 2000 one of the poorest nations on earth began negotiations with Australia over rights to the lucrative oil and gas resources of the Timor Sea. Some of these hired guns were incredibly committed, others bewilderingly ignorant of Timor. He saw how the Timorese pulled off one of the great David and Goliath feats of the region but then were unable to lay the foundations for a peaceful future. This is the inside story of Australia's attempts to bully East Timor out of a promising future in the Timor Sea oil dispute. After Indonesian troops invaded in 1975, Richard Wolcott, then ambassador to Indonesia, advised then Prime Minister Gough Whitlam that a better deal for seabed resources could be struck with Indonesia than an independent government, helping explain why Australia was the only Western nation to recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.
I think it is too long a bow to draw. Paul Cleary, a former East Timor government adviser, gives a gripping insider's account of the six years of bruising negotiations between Australia and East Timor that followed the independence ballot. Alkatiri to task for his authoritarian tendencies and nepotism. With the revenue from the oil and gas fields, the young democracy of East Timor would have a chance to secure its economic future. Contents Preface and Acknowledgements Chronology List of Maps Prologue 1 The Great Divide 2 The Spoils of Conquest 3 The Kelp in the Coffin 4 The Get Out of Gaol Card 5 Animal Farm 6 Tutorials in Politics 7 The Creative Solution 8 The Reluctant President 9 The Secret Envoy 10 The Consummate Diplomat 11 People Power 12 Brainstorming 13 The Breakdown 14 Calling in the Commandos 15 Independence Day Minus 1 16 From Ashes to Ashes Endnotes Index Paul Cleary grew up in Sydney's southwest and has worked as a journalist covering economic, social and tax policy for the Sydney Morning Herald and the Financial Review while based in Canberra Press Gallery for ten years. The close connections between the state and business are amply demonstrated in this book.
Cleary takes us back to the decision by Canberra to recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor back in 1978. So how did things go so wrong for Australia, erstwhile savior of East Timor? While his stature and force of personality initially made a good battering ram for Timor, he was notably absent from later negotiations. In return, no maritime boundary discussions were to be held for 50 years. Alkatiri, a man he knows well from working closely together. After all, Australian troops were the first to arrive after the Indonesian military and their militia thugs laid waste to Dili in 1999-just after the courageous vote for independence by U.
One gets the sense that he rallied to the fight at first, but then as the negotiations wore on, he tired of them. If they've got the resources then I think they can look forward to a pretty positive future. And the idea that in these negotiations, and indeed in other negotiations such as those Australia was involved in with the United States over the free trade agreement; the nature of these negotiations is very aggressive. In particular - and in contrast to many other online publications - we pay our contributors. Working out of the United Nations on behalf of the East Timor team, Galbraith's blustering ways antagonized the Australian negotiators, but imparted a needed bravado to the inexperienced and outgunned Timorese. The compelling inside story of how Australia attempted to bully East Timor out of its rights to the lucrative oil and gas resources of the Timor Sea and the people, both heroes and villains, who played the game for a nation's future.
Perhaps Team Australia was trying to help East Timor solve the paradox of plenty by robbing them of their resources. Alkatiri resigned in disgrace in June 2006 due to allegations about his role in arming hit squads and for mishandling a crisis within the military ranks. Shakedown details the extortionate tactics that Australian diplomats deployed to deny East Timor its legal share of oil and gas resources in the seabed of the Timor Sea that divides the two countries. Because of the author's own personal involvement—he sat in on strategy meetings and negotiations as a World Bank-appointed advisor to the Prime Minister of East Timor—he reveals what really happened when a poor nation fought against a giant for their economic future. The Timor Trough thus breaks the continental shelf between Australia and Timor, so that there are two distinct shelves, and not one and the same shelf, separating the two opposite coasts. Yahonnes maintains an active pro bono practice, including matters with the American Bar Association, the Bronx Defenders and Clemency Project 2014 related to issues such as affirmative action, policing and resentencing. The great divide -- 2.
This book is the inside story of Australia's attempt to bully her out of that future. But the real cut and thrust of the story comes post-1999. We believe in making the work of our writers as free and accessible as possible. Accommodation aside, they lost no time trying to convince the Timorese that they should accept the Timor Gap Treaty. In an ironic twist of fate, East Timor found that Australia, the country which had delivered freedom to the Timorese by intervening against Indonesia's bloody attacks in 1999, was now trying to deny it a fair share of the profits. By sticking to their principles and standing up for their legal entitlements, the Timorese ended up with a far more lucrative arrangement that enables them to share in the upside of surging energy prices.
Timor still does not have a permanent maritime boundary with Australia. In 2000 one of the poorest nations on earth began negotiations with Australia over rights to the lucrative oil and gas resources of the Timor Sea. Every little bit helps us in our efforts to bring a distinctive, values-based take on the issues and events that matter in our world. In this compelling insight into Australia's international operations, Cleary exposes the heroes and villains who emerged in a one-hundred-billion-dollar shakedown. Cleary says the Australian government so disliked him that when the treaty was finally ready in 2006, Australia suggested that the foreign ministers of each country sign the deal, in the presence of their prime ministers, in order to avoid having Alkatiri sign it with Howard This final agreement — the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea — was a success for Timor, in that it was able to claw back a better share of resources. Because of the author's own personal involvementhe sat in on strategy meetings and negotiations as a World Bank-appointed advisor to the Prime Minister of East Timorhe reveals what really happened when a poor nation fought against a giant for their economic future.
Certainly this sordid chapter in Australian diplomacy is one that Canberra's diplomats will rue, but it should be required reading for new recruits so that they can learn the folly of arrogance, duplicity and hypocrisy. These included accessing the communications of those who were working in the Timor Sea Office, as well as the more despicable act of withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2002, to avoid international adjudication of the dispute. He saw how the Timorese pulled off one of the great David and Goliath feats of the region but then were unable to lay the foundations for a peaceful future. He was confident that international law was on David's side and that ultimately this would force Goliath to bend. This is the inside story of Australia's attempts to bully East Timor out of a promising future in the Timor Sea oil dispute. Cleary gives us an insider's account of the negotiations, providing some lessons about maritime law and a tutorial on cupidity. He became engaged upon seeing a program concerning the health problems of Timorese children and outraged by his government's larcenous diplomacy.
I think the Australian people like to see themselves as fair, but the foreign policy people see it differently. And those food shortages can lead to major problems with malnutrition. Independence day minus 1 -- 16. The Indonesian government and military discovered that it's not wise to do that, and I think that going back to World War 2, Japans forces discovered that. Tutorials in politics -- 7. One of the poorest nations on earth, East Timor hoped she could have a rich future, growing rich on royalties from this deal.
The Australian government's checkered record on East Timor-a case of greed trumping principle-causes many Timorese and Australians to feel an acute sense of betrayal. Cleary has tried to reflect on the social and political realities of post-independence East Timor and how fighting the Australian government for four years impacted on the government's ability to run the country. The villains in this unseemly tale constitute a who's who of Australian politics. Calling in the commandos -- 15. Bruising and governed by the narrowest definitions of national interest.