These types of sensations, however, are much more difficult to categorize, because they are often treated as properties of bodies existing and persisting independently of our awareness of them. For Dawes Hicks this is exactly the point Stout misses when he takes his presentations to be distinct psychical existents. Alexander responds to Stout in 1910. The sensible appearance is itself something that appears, and this something is not matter; it is not even matter appearing in a fragmentary and distorted way. Cook Wilson is thus claiming that in order to even mistakenly attribute the fact to appearance, one must be acquainted with the real extension and real objects first.
Whether Nunn coherently demonstrates that the whole as a thing is distinct from its parts, is here besides the point. Specifically, I will be looking at how he tried to solve this problem within a series of articles that began with one published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in 1904. Nunn provides a few ways in which the concept of thinghood may be widened. Their papers stimulated, it seems, a very lively discussion. Contrary to what Cook Wilson explicitly says above, Russell clearly thinks physiological and psychological considerations must be constantly considered and kept in mind in accounting for such arguments from the change and variation of appearances.
The notes are not relations, nor are relations particular notes. We are now in a position to see how Alexander attempts to tackle this challenge. I am interested in the painstaking labor of science, where comfort and epistemology come into rapport and where assumptions about standards and best-practices emerge. That is, in the relation of acquaintance there is no possibility of error, while in knowledge by description such a possibility is a live one. In the first case, we see a bent stick; in the second case, we feel a bent stick, and that is all there is to it. Obviously such a problem has links, for example, with the various articulations of the Early Modern Empiricist philosophers, like Hume.
. As in the latter history, those in the Controversy also purported to avoid the mere postulation of what required explanation. Russell must have seen the analogy between the former approach psychological constructions as they were used in the Controversy and the history of mathematics of the nineteenth century. It is really quite remarkable how closely they worked together in developing the British New Realism. The mentality of both images and visual presentations is a common factor without which there would be no mental continuity between the two. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy, M.
The postulation of a thing simply evades the problem of the external world, especially if the problem is construed in the following way: if what is immediately given and directly known in the sense-experience of the world is either a psychical element Stout or only a non-mental part of the physical world Alexander , how then can one know that which is not given immediately, such as physical things, matter and other minds? These modes of consciousness, or mental acts, are thus passive in a certain sense. The second point I tried to disentangle was the respective ways the three philosophers discussed so far tried to solve the problem of the external world. Nunn, but especially Alexander, both consciously tread cautiously, so as not to merely postulate what their epistemological theories were meant to explain. The heated, but respectful, back and forth between Alexander and Nunn, on the one hand, and Stout on the other, will highlight some fundamental arguments and assumptions in their respective work. It may be evident from this outline that due to the nature of the argument there will be some overlap and repetition; this however is unavoidable. Stout began in even earlier works of 1896 and 1899 to outline a philosophical psychology that would accommodate many philosophical positions and issues, including the problem of the external world.
It does not warrant that reviews are accurate. Category: History Author : G. Stout -- Stout's doctrine of primary and secondary qualities -- Stout and the Brentano School -- Representative function of presentations -- Sensible space and real space -- Cook Wilson's geometrical counter-example -- Stout's central question -- Ideal constructions -- Ideal constructions in psychology and epistemology -- British new realism : the language of madness -- Stout's criticisms of Alexander -- Alexander's response -- The nature of sensations, images and other presentations -- What is the metaphysical problem? This is not to say that the act of dreaming is physical, but it is the dream-image which is physical. These postulates play a fundamental role in our story, for they directly and explicitly affect the way Russell understands the nature and the construction of space. This process is philosophically conditioned by certain metaphysical assumptions about the fragmentary nature of our immediate experiences such as, sensible objects , and some sort of presumed inductive principle, such as the need for continuity and uniformity in our experience of the world. One of these is that what is inferred must be other than the datum, and according to Stout, this is because of the very nature of inference. Stout and myself, and makes us seem to be at cross-purposes.
Images, unlike sensa are often experienced in the absence of the thing. This latter is the narrow point and I will deal with it later on below. On the one hand, Stout would answer in the negative. These are cases of perspective where, for example, an automobile sounds a constant horn as it drives along a radius of a large semi-circle lined up at the circumference by many stationary percipients. Gillies also offers a distinctive version of the propensity theory of probability, and the intersubjective interpretation, which develops the subjective theory.
How do non-mental partial appearances of a physical thing relate to the mind? Indeed, a further aim of the series is to deepen our understanding of the broader context in which analytic philosophy developed, by looking, for example, at the roots of analytic philosophy in neo-Kantianism or British idealism, or the connections between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, or discussing the work of philosophers who were important in the development of analytic philosophy but who are now often forgotten. According to Stout, there are two kinds of sensible extension: visual and tactual. The author re-examines the history of well known notions like 'sense-data' and 'sensibilia', and makes a case for understanding Russell's appeal for the application of 'logical constructions', at first only used as a device in mathematical logic, to the problem of the external world. So, in the case of the penny, if we take the series or the straight line created by ordering all the elliptical appearances of the penny by their size, and the separate series or straight line 126 Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers determined by all the round appearances of the same penny, these two straight lines will intersect at a perspective. Independent not-selves are not what we know as matter or things. As we shall see later, this was one of the main points of contention between Nunn and Russell. This is made clear in his distinction between primary constructions, which are constructions we make in our everyday interactions with the world ideal constructions , and secondary constructions that further build, add to and order our primary constructions in accordance to a certain conceptual framework.
These various perspectives may be understood as many private spaces, each containing its own distinct set of qualities. Stout is saying, in other words, that any representation which requires some sort of likeness or association prior to being representative, as Cook Wilson says it must, is not the sense in which he means to use this 32 Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers notion. Slater, and especially Robert E. Nasim argues that Stout was a precursor of the New Realists in that he distinguished perceptual acts from their objects, in the tradition of Brentano. The essential point is that for Russell such arguments already implicitly posit the very inferred entities in need of construction.